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Examining the effects of large and small shareholder protection on Canadian corporate 
valuation 
 
By Tongyang Zhou 
 
Abstract: First, we introduce a theoretical model of the positive effect of shareholder 
protection on the valuation of the firm.  Then, we present a linear regression model to 
examine the effect of the shareholder protection and of the cash flow ownership by a 
controlling shareholder on firm valuation. In this research, we use a sample of 366 
Canadian public firms listed on Toronto Stock Exchange market from 10 different 
industries. Consistent with the theoretical model, we find evidence of higher value of the 
firms with better shareholder protection in Canada. And the results generally confirm the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
When the laws in a country are protective to outside shareholders and are well 
enforced, investors are willing to finance firms and the financial markets will be broader 
and more valuable. But how to better protect outside investors, such as shareholders and 
creditors, and how to promote the development of financial markets are key questions to 
pose. When their rights get better legal protection, outside investors are willing to pay 
more for financial assets, such as stocks and bonds. Because they recognize that, with 
better legal protection, the company's profits will be returned to investors as more 
interest, dividends, capital gains rather than to the entrepreneur who controls the 
company and may expropriate minority shareholders. By limiting expropriation, the law 
raises the prices of securities in the market. In turn, it also allows more entrepreneurs to 
finance their investment outside the company, resulting in the expansion of financial 
markets and development of the economy.  
The effect of shareholder protection on firm valuation has been studied 
extensively in US market. La Porta et al. (2002) have presented a model of the effects of 
legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling 
shareholder on the valuation of firms. They have tested this model with 539 large firms 
of 27 different counties, and found evidence of a higher valuation of firms in countries 
with better protection of minority shareholders than in firms with higher cash flow 
ownership by a controlling shareholder. However, this examination is not focused on a 
single country with a large enough number of testing firms. It is difficult to say what are 
the unique features of the effect of shareholder protection on firm value among these 27 
countries. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the Canadian firms, this research 
will follow the lead of La Porta, and examine the effect of shareholder protection on 
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Canadian corporate valuation, and will present a theoretical and empirical analysis of 
this effect.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 According to Morck et al (1988), there exists an U-shaped relationship between 
equity ownership and firm value based on an examination of US firms. It means that a 
firm’s performance improves with higher equity ownership, but after some certain point 
a firm’s performance starts to deteriorate. Managers start to pursue private benefits at the 
expense of outside investors. Stulz (1988) formalized the cost of large shareholdings and 
expropriation minority shareholders in a model which demonstrated a concave 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. If the managerial ownership 
increases, the negative effect on firm value imposed by shareholders will exceed the 
incentive of the marginal benefits shareholders can gain. The model also shows that the 
entrenchment cost relates to manger’s ability to fend off value-enhancing takeovers.  
The ownership structure in the US has relatively little concentration. However, 
most firms in other countries are controlled by large shareholders. (Rafael La & Shleifer, 
1999) Therefore, studying non-US firms can provide better evidence about the effect of 
a large shareholder on firm value. Because of this consideration, this research will focus 
on examining the Canadian public firms regarding the effects of ownership structure on 
firm value.  
The effects of shareholder protection and ownership structure on corporate 
valuation have been studied extensively. Large shareholders have stronger incentives to 
maximize the firm value, and are more capable to gather information regarding to 
manager performance. Therefore, they can help to overcome one of the biggest issues in 
corporate management the agency problem. However, large shareholders can look for 
their own interests, which do not coincide with the interest of other investors and 
employees. (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997)  
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“Firm’s performance improves with higher managerial ownership, but that, after 
a point, managers become entrenched and pursue private benefits at the expense of 
outside investors.” (Claessens et al, 2002) 
 
 There also exists a negative relation between large controlling shareholders and 
firm value, and a positive effect between cash flow rights of large shareholders and firm 
value. Increases in control rights by the large shareholder are accompanied by declines 
in firm value. However, an increase in cash flow rights by the large shareholder is 
associated with an increase in firm value.  
The legal protection of minority shareholders and outside investors can help 
prevent the large shareholder searching for own benefit and manager tunneling of firm 
value, which includes outright theft and selling products or assets below market value.  
La Porta (2002) examined 27 companies countries about the effect of legal protection on 
valuation, and found evidence that higher valuation of the firms often combines with 
better protection of minority shareholders. Moreover, the difference lay among countries 
in term of the structure of laws and their enforcements are that should account for the 
different effects on firm valuation. Canada, compared with U.S. and European countries, 
appears to be a one that does not easily fit into a simple dichotomous world. It neither 
lies in the Anglo-American model, which relies heavily on external constraints, nor in 
the Continental European model, which relies more heavily on internal constraints. 
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998) 
  Based on these former studies, this research will examine the effect of 
shareholder protection on firm value of Canadian public firms.  It proposes to offer 
support of a positive relationship between the degree of shareholder protection and firm 
value, and also evidence of a concave relationship between equity ownership and firm 
value.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1       THEORETICAL MODEL 
First, we assume a firm is fully controlled by a single shareholder which is called 
the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is also the manager of the firm, who owns α percent 
of the firm cash flows. Secondly, we assume the firm has an amount of cash C, and will 
invest in a project which can generate a gross return of R. So, the profit of the project is 
RI without any cost incurred. The entrepreneur can benefit himself by diverting a share 
of the profit from the firm to his own account and this transfer of shares can take place 
in the form of salary, personal loans, non-arm-length transactions, and outright theft. As 
a result, he will receive sRI-C(k,s)RI from the company. C(k,s) is the cost of theft, 
which is the profit he wastes when s is diverted. K is the degree of shareholder 
protection the firm offered. The better protection provided, the more firm value would 
be increased. We can assume that stealing is costlier in a more protective legal regime, 
𝐶! > 0, marginal cost of stealing should be larger than zero, 𝐶!! > 0, and marginal cost 
of stealing rises as more is stolen, 𝐶!" > 0.  
 Based on La Porta’s (2002) research model about the effect of investor 
protection on firm valuation, we know the entrepreneur should maximize his profit by 
maximizing: 
                                       𝛼 1− 𝑠 𝑅𝐼 + 𝑠𝑅𝐼 − 𝐶 𝑘, 𝑠 𝑅𝐼                                              3.1 
Because the function has the shared multiplier RI, we can assume that the entrepreneur 
maximizes: 
                                                𝑈 = 𝛼 1− 𝑠 + 𝑠 − 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑠)                                        3.2 
Then we will get the first order of this function regarding to s: 
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                                                𝑈! = −𝛼 + 1− 𝐶! 𝑘, 𝑠 = 0                                       3.3 
It can be written as: 
                                                         𝐶! 𝑘, 𝑠 = 1− 𝛼                                                 3.4       
Based on this function, we can arrange the first condition of it and get several testable 
implications. Taking the first order difference with respect to k, we get 
                                                         !!
∗
!"
= − !!" !,!
!!! !,!
< 0                                             3.5 
It means that better shareholder protection leads to the less expropriation. Taking the 
first order condition of α, we obtain 





< 0                                              3.6 
This means that the entrepreneur has higher cash flow rights of the firm; there is less 
expropriation of minority shareholders. If we change the 𝑠∗  with equation  𝑞 =
1− 𝑠∗ 𝑅, where q is the Tobin’s Q ratio, we can get the following conditions: 





𝑅 > 0                                                3.7 





𝑅 > 0                                                3.8 
The first one demonstrates that the firm with more protection of shareholders should 
have more firm value. The second one means that the firm should be worth more value if 
the controlling entrepreneur has more cash flow rights of the firm.  
3.2       RESEARCH MODEL 
 In order to test the effect of shareholder protection on firm value, this study 
accepts the use of the linear regression method. Due to its simple and efficient qualities, 
linear regression has been applied among many similar former studies. La Porta et al. 
(2002) estimated the relationship between valuation, investor protection and ownership 
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using linear regression model. Claessens et al. (2002) also applied linear regression 
methods to test the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership on corporate 
valuation.  
 In this research, the dependent variable is firm value, and the independent 
variables include degree of shareholder protection and cash flow rights held by the firm-
controlling shareholder. Moreover, this study adds two more independent variables, firm 
size (Kumar et al, 1999) and investment opportunities (Beck et al, 2008), to the model. It 
supposed to be a positive effect of investment opportunities and firm size on firm value.  
                                                𝑉 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐺 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑑𝐶𝐹 + 𝜀                                        3.9 
Where V is firm value, G is investment opportunities, P is shareholder protection, and 
CF is cash flow hold by controlling-shareholder. All the coefficients of the variables in 
the model are larger than zero. In other words, all the independent variables have 
positive effect on the value of dependent variable.  
 The higher level of investment opportunities should have a positive effect on the 
firm value. It shows that the firm has the ability to generate more profit in the future. If 
the company offers better protection to the shareholders, it will prevent the manager 
from tunneling and minority shareholder expropriation, and increase the firm value. If 
the cash flows of the firm held by large shareholder increase, it will prevent them from 
tunneling firm assets as well and eventually increase firm value.  
3.3       SAMPLING DESIGN 
 There are over 6500 public companies in Canada. It would be time consuming 
and inefficient to examine every public company, therefore, the research will only test 
the firms which are currently listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) market. 
 10 
These stocks must meet several specific requirements. The firm should prepare a 
comprehensive business plan, have strong growth prospects, have a track record of 
financial and non-financial performance, be in a position of competitive strength along 
both financial and non-financial measure, have a clear understanding of how the 
company compares to peers, map out and implement improvement initiatives, and 
minimize window dressings. Compared to unlisted public companies, the firms listed on 
the TSX have less accounting problems, and are more mature in their own business. 
Using the TSX listed companies in the research will offer better results.  
 There were 1560 stocks listed on the TSX at the end of June 2013. Excluding all 
the income funds and structured product and diversified industry sectors, the total 
number of the public companies, which have large shareholders, is 804. Like La Porta et 
al. (2002), we also exclude all affiliates of foreign firms and the subsidiaries of other 
firms. Further more, we filter the large shareholder ownership data regarding to the one 
who owns over 5 percent of the cash flow of the firm. In this research sample, there are 
10 different industries, which are divided recording to TSX listing sectors. Table 3.1 
gives details about the size of each sector. 
Table 3.1 Summaries of Sample Firms 
Sector Number of Firms 
Clean Technology 36 
Communication and Media 28 
Financial Services 54 
Forest Products 14 
Life Sciences 42 
Oil and Gas 279 
Real Estate 14 
Technology 47 




3.4       MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES 
There are five variables in our research model, which are firm value, investment 
opportunities, firm size, shareholder protection and cash flow owned by controlling 
shareholder. We need to find each variable an appropriate proxy or measurement to test 
the model. 
3.4.1 Firm Value 
Here, we use Tobin’s Q as the measurement of firm value. (La Porta et al, 2002) 
Researchers have used market-to-book ratio as well as Tobin’s Q to measure the 
variations in market values resulting form different ownership structure. The 
denominator of Tobin’s Q is defined as the book value of assets, and the numerator is 
the book value of assets minus the book value of common stocks and deferred taxes plus 
the market value of the equity. The data source is Mergent Online Database 
3.4.2 Investment Opportunities 
The sales growth rate is used as the proxy for the firm’s existing investment 
opportunities. Here we collect the last year annual percentage sales growth rate, which is 
2012 sales growth rate, and all the sales data are expressed in Canadian Dollars. The 
Mergent Online Database is the data source.  
3.4.3 Shareholder Protection 
In the research, Anti-director right measures the degree of shareholder 
protection. (La Porta et al, 2002) The anti-director rights is formed by adding one when: 
(1) the firm allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not 
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required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (3) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors 
is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities extraordinary mechanism is in place, (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to sample mean, or (6) when 
shareholder have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. 
The range for the index is from zero to six. The Source for this variable is Sedar.  
3.4.4 Cash Flows Owned by Controlling Shareholders 
Cash Flow rights are computed as the product of all the stock ownership along 
the control chian. The control chain is combined with a shareholder’s direct and indirect 
voting rights in the firm. Direct owning shares are the stocks registered under the 
shareholder’s name, and Indirect owning shares are shares held by entities that in turn 
the shareholder controls. When two or more shareholders meet our criteria for control, 
the sum of direct and indirect voting rights exceed 10 percent, we would assign control 
to the shareholder with the largest voting rights. Source: Bloomberg Database. 
3.5       DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
 In order to generate the controlling shareholder percentage ownership, we only 
keep the firm with 10 percent or higher than 10 percent of the equities owned by one 
shareholder, no matter whether the owner is an individual or a corporation. In each 
company, only the highest ownership data will be reserved for this research. As a result, 
there are 366 firms that meet all the qualifications in ten different industries.  
Table 3.2 Summaries of Final Sample Firms 
Sector Number of Firms 
Clean Technology 27 
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Communication and Media 21 
Financial Services 25 
Forest Products 7 
Life Sciences 25 
Oil and Gas 49 
Real Estate 9 
Technology 27 
Utilities and Pipelines 6 
Mining 170 
Total 366 
3.5.1    Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is the proxy used to measure the valuation of the firm. It needs the 
book value of the total assets, book value of the equity, deferred taxes, and market value 
of the equities to calculate its value. All of these inputs variables are generated from the 
Mergent Online Database. The range of the value starts from -33.71, and ends at 50.42. 
Most of the values fluctuate between 1 and 2. The average of Tobin’s Q is 1.31.  
Table 3.3 Summary of Tobin’s Q 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Tobin’s Q 366 1.314481 4.070626 -33.71 50.42 
From Table 3.4, Life Sciences has the highest Tobin’s Q, 5.4145, which means 
Life Sciences industry has the highest level of firm value compared to other industries, 
and technology firms have the lowest average Tobin’s Q value.  
Table 3.4 Mean Value of Tobin’s Q in Each Industry 
Industry Mean 
Clean Technology  1.3124 
Communication & Media  2.3471 
Financial Services  2.1106 
Forest Products  1.1417 
Life Sciences  5.4145 
Mining  0.8042 
Oil & Gas  1.0840 
Real Estate  0.9820 
Technology  0.5157 
Utilities & Pipelines  1.0606 
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3.5.2    Sales Growth Rate 
To analyze the effect of sales growth on firm valuation, we will use the last year 
sales growth rate. In order to calculate 2012 sales growth rate, we need to have the total 
revenue of 2011 and 2012, which are available on the Mergent Online Database. 
Because of the unique accounting record method generally applied in the Mining 
industry, most of firms don’t have revenue account in their income statements, then we 
used operating income before taxes to substitute for revenue. 
Table 3.5 Summary of Sales Growth Rate 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Sales Growth Rate 366 8.15511% 1.312835 -15.3543 6.8428 
 
Table 3.6 presents the average sales growth rate among different industries. Life 
Sciences has the highest sales growth rate in 2012, and Communication and Media 
industry has the lowest sales growth rate, which decreased nearly 24%. 
 
Table 3.6 Mean Value of Sales Growth Rate in Each Industry 
Industry Mean 
Clean Technology  18.82% 
Communication & Media  -23.43% 
Financial Services  10.18% 
Forest Products  4.62% 
Life Sciences  33.67% 
Mining  -2.09% 
Oil & Gas  28.20% 
Real Estate  5.59% 
Technology  3.75% 
Utilities & Pipelines  -8.34% 
 
3.5.3 Anti-director Rights 
According to the rules of Anti-director right index, we assign each firm a number 
value correlated with its level of shareholder protection. The mean value of the sample is 
4.79. Most of public firms in Canada allow shareholders to mail their proxy and use 
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cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors. 
Further more, they also offer an oppressed minorities mechanism. 
Table 3.7 Summaries of Anti-director Rights 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Anti-director Rights 366 4.786885 0.6566354 3 6 
  
All of the ten industries have the similar average Anti-director rights. The 
technology industry took the first place with 5.1481 shareholder protection degree.  
Table 3.8 Mean Values of Anti-director Rights in Each Industry 
Industry Mean 
Clean Technology  4.8148 
Communication & Media  4.8571 
Financial Services  4.8000 
Forest Products  5.1429 
Life Sciences  4.8400 
Mining  4.6118 
Oil & Gas  4.9796 
Real Estate  5.1111 
Technology  5.1481 
Utilities & Pipelines  5.0000 
 
3.5.4 Cash Flows Owned by Controlling Shareholder 
The arithmetic mean value of percentage cash flow owned by the largest 
controlling shareholder is 19.10%. The range of cash flow right is from 7.51% to 
70.12%. The Forest Product industry has the highest mean value of cash flow ownership, 
and Technology sector has the lowest level of cash flow ownership. 
 
Table 3.9 Summary of Cash Flows Owned by Controlling Shareholder 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Cash Flow Rights 366 19.10101% .0941621 7.51% 70.12% 
 
Table 3.10 Mean Value of Cash Flows Owned by Controlling Shareholder in 
Each Industry 
Industry Mean 
Clean Technology  18.71% 
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Communication & Media  28.16% 
Financial Services  20.62% 
Forest Products  32.80% 
Life Sciences  18.06% 
Mining  18.29% 
Oil & Gas  18.12% 
Real Estate  27.42% 
Technology  15.14% 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 This chapter will present the results of the linear regression in regard to the 
whole sample as well as different industries. Table 4.1 presents the relationship between 
valuation, investor protection, and ownership. We estimated all the industry regressions 
using random effects. The random effects specification apply both internal and between 
industry variations in cash flow controlled by a large shareholder to estimate the impact 
on firm valuation. But it will not treat the company in a particular industry as an 
independent observer. The standard error is used to reflect the cross-correlation between 
observations due to common industry components. 
 
Table 4.1 Results of random-effect Regression for the Whole Sample 
  
 Table 4.1 presents results of random-effect regression for the sample of 366 
firms with a controlling shareholder. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which stands 
for the firm valuation in the test model. The independent variables are (1) growth in sale, 
2012 sales growth rate; (2) anti-director rate, the proxy for shareholder protection level 
in the model; (3) cash flow ownership, the percentage of firm’s cash flows owned by 
controlling shareholder. It also presents the constant variable in the model.  
  In Table 4.1, Anti-director rates and cash flow ownership both have a positive 
coefficient in the model, which meet the specifications in the theories. The cash flow 
ownership has a statistically significant effect on firm value at the five percent level, 
because the t-statistic value is 2.25; larger than two. However, the sales growth rate has 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate -0.15 -0.15 -0.92 0.360 
Anti-director Rate 0.93 0.32 2.88 0.004 
Cash Flow Ownership 0.17 2.25 0.08 0.939 
Cons. -3.16 1.60 -1.97 0.050 
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an insignificant negative coefficient, which does not coincide with the theoretical 
forecast. This may has resulted from the data we used to calculate the growth rate. In the 
mining industry, due to the different accounting procedures, most of the firms do not 
have revenue or an sales account in their income statements, and we used operating 
income before taxes in year 2011 and 2012 to calculate the sales growth rate. 
Furthermore, a large part of the firms in mining industry has negative operating incomes. 
These facts may lead to our deviation from the ‘right’ path.  
 
Table 4.2 Results of Regression for Ten Industries 
Clean Technology 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate -0.0416 0.1381 -0.30 0.766 
Anti-director Rate 0.5967 0.1972 3.03 0.006 
Cash Flow Ownership -0.5460 2.3282 -0.23 0.817 
Cons. -1.4502 1.0857 -1.34 0.195 
Communication and Media 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate -0.3234 0.7303 -0.44 0.663 
Anti-director Rate 0.8611 0.2172 3.96 0.001 
Cash Flow Ownership -0.6658 1.0907 -0.61 0.550 
Cons. -2.5281 1.0004 -2.53 0.022 
Financial Services 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate -0.9719 3.0565 -0.32 0.754 
Anti-director Rate -0.9610 1.5575 -0.62 0.544 
Cash Flow Ownership -4.1462 11.3903 -0.36 0.719 
Cons. 7.6775 7.5659 1.01 0.322 
Forest Product 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate -2.6121 2.5157 -1.04 0.375 
Anti-director Rate 1.0531 0.2770 3.80 0.032 
Cash Flow Ownership 0.7809 1.1561 0.68 0.548 
Cons. -4.4114 1.4482 -3.05 0.056 
Life Science 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate -1.8117 1.8161 -1.00 0.330 
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Anti-director Rate 5.7545 3.9872 1.44 0.164 
Cash Flow Ownership 8.8781 23.6869 0.37 0.712 
Cons. -23.4304 21.0643 -1.11 0.279 
Mining 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate -0.1329 0.1207 -1.10 0.272 
Anti-director Rate 0.4610 0.3180 1.45 0.149 
Cash Flow Ownership 0.3132 2.4583 0.13 0.899 
Cons. -1.3821 1.5409 -0.90 0.371 
Oil and Gas 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate 0.0208 0.0918 0.23 0.822 
Anti-director Rate 0.4070 0.1539 2.64 0.011 
Cash Flow Ownership 0.3642 1.0676 0.34 0.735 
Cons. -1.0142 0.7967 -1.27 0.210 
Real Estate 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate 0.1376 0.3143 0.44 0.680 
Anti-director Rate 1.3877 0.2131 6.51 0.001 
Cash Flow Ownership 0.6351 0.4478 1.42 0.215 
Cons. -6.2923 1.1312 -5.56 0.003 
Technology 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate -4.9832 3.7115 -1.34 0.192 
Anti-director Rate 8.3155 2.6637 3.12 0.005 
Cash Flow Ownership 13.2656 23.4068 0.57 0.576 
Cons. -44.1156 14.4424 -3.05 0.006 
Utilities and Pipelines 
Tobin's Q Coef. Std. Err.  t  P>|t| 
Sales Growth Rate 0.2184 0.5590 0.39 0.722 
Anti-director Rate 0.0000 
  
  
Cash Flow Ownership -0.2649 1.7298 -0.15 0.888 
Cons. 1.1320 0.4038 2.80 0.068 
  
 Table 4.2 shows the regression results of ten different industries. The number 
printed in bold with underlines stand for the value is significant at 10 percent or higher 
confidence. On the other hand, the results based on the data from forest product, real 
estate, and utilities and pipelines should be wiped out from our consideration, because 
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the available data point in these three industries is less than ten. It cannot obtain 
reasonable regression results with limited data points.  
Most of their anti-director rights have significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q 
value except financial service, life science, and utilities and pipelines. Especially, real 
estate sector has the highest value of coefficient.  However, the Financial Service 
industry has a totally different business-running model compared to others. Due to this 
reason, La Porta et al (2002) didn’t conclude the Financial Service industry into his 
research sample. In this paper, the result further shows that the financial service industry 
needs a different model or variables to explain the firm valuation changes.  
 The cash flow ownership of six industries, include forest product, life science, 
mining, oil and gas, real estate, and technology, have positive effect on Tobin’s Q value. 
The other industries manifest negative effect on the firm valuation. And seven of the ten 
industries has a negative coefficient of sales growth rate, and only three of them get the 
positive coefficient value, which coincide with academic theory and former studies. This 
consequence may be due to the data mining process of the research sample. La Porta et 
al (2002) only tested the largest market capital size companies and their results proved 
positive effect on sales growth rate. This research, however, not only examined the most 
valuable firms, but also the relatively smaller size firms.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1       ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS  
In this section, we will address four issues of the robustness. (1) Can differences 
in market liquidity among industries account for our results? (2) Are the results 
somehow driven by more complex ownership structures? (3) Are our results driven by 
the choice of impropriate variable proxy? (4) And are our results driven by the selection 
of the research sample? 
It can be argued that firm valuation is low when capital markets are illiquid. 
Firms may find it costly to raise money externally for agency reasons or, alternatively, 
the premium requirements. A liquidity premium may explain some industries having 
small coefficient of cash flow ownership, but this does not suffice to explain the 
negative value of the coefficients in some industries. Regardless of each firm’s required 
rate of return, the research assumes that every firm in a non-agency world will invest 
until the marginal Tobin’s Q equals to one. However, in practice, we used the actual 
value of Tobin’s Q, not the marginal value because of the unavailable marginal Tobin’s 
Q data. On the other hand, some private cash flows controlled by the large shareholder 
cannot be collected in the research, and they may account for our results.  
The last year sales growth may be a poor measure of the firm’s investment 
opportunities, which may be one cause of the bias of the results. Maybe the research 
should apply the geometric average of the past three-year sales growth rate. Another 
possible bias in our analysis is that the research only focuses on the largest shareholder 
in the firm with a stake above 10 percent. The reason behind the data-filtering standard 
is to make sure that the results are driven by the effects described in the model rather 
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than by the interaction between several large shareholders. The interaction between large 
shareholders of one firm, however, may have significant effects on firm valuation. The 
model doesn’t include any variables related to explaining this interaction, which may 
result in the biased test results.  
The main data-filtering standard is to examine the firms which are currently 
listed on Toronto Stock Exchange market, this and maybe the biggest bias of the 
analysis. Some sectors of TSX have a smaller number of listed companies, such as 
Utilities and Forest Products. So it is hard to make any valuable conclusions based on a 
relatively small amount of data. In any further study, we may need to add more quality 
firms to these small size industries of the TSX, and then we may get more valuable 
results. 
5.2       CONCLUSIONS 
 In this paper, we presented a simple theory of the shareholder protection and 
ownership effects on firm valuation in different industries, for a large sample of publicly 
traded corporations in Canada. The main contribution of this research is generally to 
confirm the prediction that poor shareholder protection is penalized with lower firm 
valuation in Canada and the higher cash flow owned by the controlling shareholder 
improves firm valuation. These results are consistent with a large amount of the pervious 
literature. The sales growth rate, however, shows the inverse effect on firm valuation 
than our prediction. It may be the result of data mining problems, or if we added more 
variables in the model, the results may be different.  
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